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Introduction and background
Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act) were introduced into the legislation as an 
anti-avoidance measure to prevent tax avoidance by means of a donation, settlement or other 
disposition by a taxpayer, to or in favour of another, in various types of schemes. In terms of these 
provisions, a person other than the person who is entitled to the income or who receives the income is 
deemed to be taxable on certain ‘income’. Although the Income Tax Act 28 of 1914 (1914 Act) contained 
a section that is equivalent to the current Section 7(1) deemed accrual provision and a section that is 
the predecessor of the current Section 7(2), the equivalent of the current Sections 7(3) to 7(8) was only 
added much later: As the years went by, more tax avoidance schemes were designed by taxpayers and 
the legislature attempted to close the loopholes by introducing further anti-avoidance measures. The 
predecessor of Section 7(3) was added to Income Tax Act 40 of 1925, although no reference was yet 
made to a donation, settlement or other disposition (those words were only added by Income Tax Act 
28 of 1932, resulting in the section closely reflecting the current version of Section 7[3]). Provisions 
similar to the provisions of the current Sections 7(4) to 7(6) have been part of the South African income 
tax legislation since 1941 (Republic of South Africa 1941). Section 7(7) was only added in 1983 to 
counter tax avoidance schemes whereby taxpayers attempted to transfer certain of their income to 
others, without necessarily surrendering control over the income or over the investments that generate 
the income (Republic of South Africa 1983). Section 7(8) was only introduced in 2000 (Republic of 
South Africa 2000), although its provisions were previously covered by the scope of section 9D of the 
Act. The provisions of section 9D used to provide for the taxation of investment income of controlled 
foreign entities (presently known as controlled foreign companies) and investment income arising 
from donations, settlements or other dispositions. However, it was proposed in 2000 that section 9D 
only deal with the income of controlled foreign entities and that the anti-avoidance provisions relating 
Background: Section 7 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (the Act) was introduced as an anti-
avoidance measure to prevent tax avoidance by means of a donation, settlement or other 
disposition in various types of schemes. In terms of this section, in certain circumstances, 
‘income’ is deemed to be income received by or accrued to a taxpayer. Despite the fact that the 
term ‘income’ has been used in Section 7 from the time that it was first introduced into the Act 
and the fact that it is defined in section 1 of the Act, there still remains uncertainty regarding 
the intention of the legislature and the actual meaning of the term in terms of Section 7.
Aim: The objective of the study is to understand whether the term ‘income’, as used in Sections 
7(2) to 7(8) of the Act, is used in its defined sense or if it should be ascribed a different meaning.
Setting: This article examines existing literature in a South African income tax environment.
Method: A non-empirical study of existing literature was conducted by performing a historical 
analysis within a South African context. A doctrinal research approach was followed.
Results: Possible interpretations determined include ‘income’ as defined in section 1 of the 
Act, namely ‘gross income’ (also defined) less exempt income, ‘gross income’, profits and 
gains or ‘taxable income’ (i.e. ‘income’ less allowable expenditure, deductions and losses) and 
‘gross income’ less related deductible expenses and losses.
Conclusion: It was found that the meaning of ‘income’, for purposes of Sections 7(2) to 7(8), 
remains an uncertainty, and it is recommended that the wording of Section 7 be amended to 
reflect the intended meaning thereof.
A critical analysis of the meaning of the 
term ‘income’ in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of the 
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to donations, settlements or other dispositions be included in 
Section 7, which deals with similar anti-avoidance issues 
(Republic of South Africa 2000).
Various other changes were made to Section 7 over the years 
to either cover additional loopholes, to clarify the provisions 
or to simply make consequential amendments where other 
legislation, definitions and terminology changed. Section 7(2) 
was amended numerous times to clarify which persons and 
what income are covered by its provisions. The section 
initially only deemed the income of a married woman to be 
the income of her husband, but this was subsequently 
amended to deem the income of either spouse (husband or 
wife) to be the income of the other spouse, in certain 
circumstances (Republic of South Africa 1991). Other notable 
amendments to Section 7 include: the addition of Sections 
7(2B) and 7(8)(b) to allow any deduction or allowance relating 
to the income, in the hands of the spouse (or resident, in the 
case of Section 7[8]) that is being taxed on the deemed income 
(Republic of South Africa 1992, 2005a) and the amendment of 
Section 7(8) to refer to ‘any amount…which would have 
constituted income’ instead of to ‘income’ (Republic of South 
Africa 2004a).
Throughout the current Section 7, with the exception of 
Section 7(8), the term ‘income’ is used in the deemed income 
provisions of this section. Section 7(8) also used to refer to 
‘income’, until it was amended in 2004, as pointed out above. 
The term ‘income’ has, in fact, been used in Section 7 from the 
time it was first introduced into the Act. In addition, the term 
‘income’ is defined in section 1 of the Act and has had the 
same meaning, namely ‘the amount remaining of the gross 
income…after deducting therefrom any amounts exempt 
from normal tax…’, since 1925 (Republic of South Africa 
1925, 1941, 1962). The 1914 Act, which contains the 
predecessors of the current Section 7(1) and 7(2), also referred 
to ‘income’ in those sections, although ‘income’ had an 
entirely different meaning back then. There was no distinction 
between ‘gross income’ and ‘income’ in 1914 and ‘income’ 
was defined as ‘any gains or profits derived by, or accrued to 
or in favour of…from any source within the Union…’. 
However, although the term used in Section 7 and its 
definition in section 1 have remained unchanged from 1925, 
there still remains uncertainty regarding the intention of the 
legislature and the actual meaning of the term in terms of 
Section 7.
Problem statement
The term ‘income’ is defined in Section 1 of the Act as ‘the 
amount remaining of the gross income… after deducting 
therefrom any amounts exempt from normal tax under Part I 
of Chapter II’. The term ‘income’ is, however, used in some 
provisions of the Act, where the meaning thereof could be 
interpreted to be different to the definition in Section 1 of the 
Act, such as in the anti-avoidance measures of Section 7. If 
these sections of the Act are interpreted incorrectly, it can 
have far-reaching consequences, which might lead to either a 
loss to the fiscus or unfair tax consequences for the taxpayer.
Various academic writers have identified the lack of guidance 
from the South African government regarding the meaning 
of the term ‘income’, as used in Sections 7(2) to 7(8). These 
writers have different opinions regarding whether the term 
means ‘income’ in the literal (ordinary) sense of the word or 
if it should be ascribed a different meaning in the context that 
it is used (Clegg & Stretch 2007; Davis, Olivier & Urquhart 
1999; De Koker & Williams 2001; De Swardt et al. 2015; 
Meyerowitz 2008; Meyerowitz & Spiro 1995; Olivier 1989).
Research objective, research 
methodology, scope and value 
of research
The objective of the study is to understand whether the term 
‘income’, as used in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of the Act, is used in 
its defined sense, namely the amount remaining of the ‘gross 
income’ after the deduction of allowable exemptions, or if it 
should be ascribed a different meaning. A non-empirical 
study of existing literature was conducted by performing a 
historical analysis within a South African context. A doctrinal 
research approach was followed by applying the following 
steps to solve the specific research problem, as suggested by 
Hutchinson and Duncan (2012):
•	 gathering the relevant facts
•	 identifying the relevant legal issue at hand
•	 analysing the issue from a legal perspective
•	 studying relevant background material such as 
dictionaries, textbooks and journal articles, inter alia
•	 analysing primary research sources such as case law and 
legislation
•	 combining all issues within the context
•	 reaching a preliminary conclusion.
The research objective was achieved by investigating the 
following:
•	 the meaning of the term ‘income’ as used in Sections 7(2) 
to 7(8) of the Act, by exploring the ordinary definition 
thereof as well as obtaining an understanding of the 
different interpretations suggested by various academic 
writers, as there is no specific guidance available in this 
regard
•	 the impact of the different possible interpretations of the 
term ‘income’ in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of the Act on a 
taxpayer’s ‘taxable income’.
The study can potentially highlight areas for improvement 
or, at the very least, for a consideration by the South African 
Department of National Treasury to clarify the meaning of 
the term ‘income’ in Sections 7(2) to 7(8). The study can 
potentially also assist taxpayers to understand this intended 
meaning, to correctly apply the provisions thereof in their tax 
returns. This could prevent possible unfair tax consequences 
to either taxpayers or the fiscus.
The study commences with a brief summary of all the 
possible literal (ordinary) meanings of the term ‘income’ and 
a discussion of the possible approaches to the interpretation 
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of legislation. This is followed by a discussion of the possible 
interpretations of the term ‘income’, as suggested by various 
academic writers, for each of the Sections 7(2) to 7(8), a 
practical illustration of the impact of each possible 
interpretation on a taxpayer’s taxable income and a 
conclusion regarding the most likely interpretation intended 
by the legislature, based on the literature study performed. 
The study concludes with recommendations for the 
amendment of the existing wording in Section 7 in order to 
clarify the legislature’s intention regarding the amounts that 
are deemed to have accrued to a specific person.
The literal (ordinary) meaning of the 
term ‘income’
The term ‘income’ can have different meanings, depending 
on the context in which it is used. The possible literal 
(ordinary) meaning of the term ‘income’ is assessed in terms 
of dictionaries, as well as from an accounting, general 
business and tax perspective.
The Oxford English Dictionary (2015) defines ‘income’, inter 
alia, as profit and proceeds, while the Collins English 
Dictionary (2015) defines it as ‘the amount of monetary or 
other returns, either earned or unearned, accruing over a 
given period of time’ or ‘receipts or revenue’. The Penguin 
English Dictionary (2015) has a similar definition as the 
Collins English Dictionary, namely ‘money received from 
work, property, or investment, regularly or over a specified 
time’. The Chambers Dictionary (2015), on the other hand, 
defines ‘income’ as profit or interest from anything, as well as 
revenue. It therefore seems as if dictionaries define income as 
representing both a gross and net amount (in other words, 
after deducting expenditure).
The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS 
Foundation 2015) define ‘income’ as:
increases in economic benefits during an accounting period in 
the form of inflows or enhancements of assets or decreases of 
liabilities which result in an increase in equity, other than those 
relating to contributions from equity participants. (Appendix A)
This clearly refers to gross amounts, as opposed to net 
amounts after deductions. From a business perspective, 
income is generally accepted to represent total receipts, 
revenue or earnings, in other words, also a gross amount.
The Act, on the other hand, defines the term ‘income’ in 
Section 1 as ‘gross income’ less the exempted income, but 
before any deductions. According to Clegg and Stretch (2015), 
‘unless the context otherwise indicates’, the meaning 
attributed to specific words must be those given in the 
definition sections of the Act. Section 1 of the Act, which 
defines ‘income’, contains the words ‘unless the context 
otherwise indicates’. This stipulates that the defined meaning 
provided will not necessarily apply in all circumstances. 
Clegg and Stretch (2015) further note that, in establishing 
whether or not the context indicates otherwise, the whole of 
the Act must be considered, as other parts of the Act can shed 
light upon the legislature’s intention.
For purposes of this study, the literal (ordinary) meaning of 
the term ‘income’ will be interpreted as the defined meaning 
in Section 1 of the Act, unless the context otherwise indicates.
Interpretation of words used by the 
legislature
In this section of the article, the interpretation of words used 
by the legislature is briefly discussed, to form the basis for the 
interpretation of the term ‘income’ as used in Sections 7(2) to 
7(8). Clegg and Stretch (2015) note that the interpretation of 
statutes is frequently a tough task and the rules of 
interpretation are not applied consistently. They further state 
that income tax is, in principle, a creature of statute, and the 
principles of interpretation which apply to statutes, also 
apply to the interpretation of tax statutes.
According to De Koker and Williams (2015), the meaning of 
the words used by the legislature is often unclear because of 
the nature of the language. Reference is made to case law in 
this regard for guidance on interpretation. Two main 
approaches of interpretation are applied by the courts when 
interpreting the law: the literal (textual) approach and the 
purposive (contextual) approach (De Swardt et al. 2015).
In terms of the literal approach, the interpreter pays attention 
to the plain language of the provisions of the Act (De Koker & 
Williams 2015). The literal approach to the interpretation 
was described in the judgement of Cape Brandy Syndicate v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners K.B. (Swarbrick 2015), as 
follows:
…[I]n a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly 
said…There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as 
to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing to be implied. One can 
only look fairly at the language used. (p. 71)
According to Van der Zwan (2015), the literal approach was, 
however, altered slightly in the case of R Koster & Son (Pty) 
Ltd & Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 47 SATC 23. 
In circumstances where the literal approach gives rise to 
absurdity, inconsistency, hardship or anomaly, the courts 
may depart from the ordinary meaning of the word, to the 
extent that is required to eliminate the absurdity, inconsistency, 
hardship or anomaly and to give effect to the intention of the 
legislature by interpreting the word in its context (De Koker & 
Williams 2015). If the ordinary wording does not indicate 
the intention of the legislature, the contra fiscum rule must 
apply, which means that the text must be given the 
interpretation that is in favour of the taxpayer (De Koker & 
Williams 2015).
The purposive approach determines the purpose of the 
legislation by taking all the adjacent circumstances and 
resources into account (De Swardt et al. 2015). In order to 
give meaning to the fundamental purpose of the statute, the 
interpreter takes numerous factors into account, including 
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the context and political context in which the legislation was 
approved, the evil which the legislation is intended to forbid 
and punish and the good which the legislation is intended to 
indorse (Mota 2012). According to Van der Zwan (2015), the 
purposive approach essentially entails legislation to be 
interpreted holistically. He further remarks that wording 
with several interpretations, and where the purpose of the 
legislation may not be reflected by some of them, should be 
seen as preconditions for this interpretation approach and 
not necessarily ambiguous wording. Ambiguity or 
uncertainty arises where the meaning of the words used is 
unclear and can either be regarding individual words or an 
entire phrase (Clegg & Stretch 2015).
Sections 39(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (the Constitution) state the 
following:
1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum:
 (a)  must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom
 (b) must consider international law
 (c) may consider foreign law.
2. When interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal 
or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.
Sections 39(1) and (2) of the Constitution, therefore, indicate 
that it is vital that the purposive approach be followed when 
interpreting legislation (De Swardt et al. 2015). Mdumbe 
(2004) states that the starting point when interpreting 
legislation remains to read the text. The courts should, 
nevertheless, also consider the broader context and not limit 
themselves to the wording of the text.
In 2008, Goldswain performed a study to examine the way 
that the interpretation of fiscal legislation is approached by our 
judiciary. The study concluded that the promulgation of the 
Constitution has been a catalyst for a change in interpretation 
approaches, from literal to purposive (Goldswain 2008).
Following the aforementioned, the ordinary (literal) meaning of 
the term ‘income’ will be referred to, unless it is in conflict with 
the intention of the legislature and the Bill of Rights. However, 
seen that Section 1 of the Act, which defines ‘income’, contains 
the words ‘unless the context otherwise indicates’, the defined 
meaning will not necessarily apply in all circumstances. All 
circumstances and resources, therefore, need to be considered, 
to determine the meaning of the term in context of its overall 
purpose and in context of the Act as a whole. It is therefore 
submitted that a purposive approach is followed in interpreting 
the meaning of the term ‘income’ in Sections 7(2) to 7(8).
In the next section, the article aims to outline the working of 
Sections 7(2) to 7(8) by investigating the possible meanings of 
the term ‘income’ as envisaged in each of these provisions.
Understanding the meaning of 
‘income’ in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) 
of the Act
Section 7(2) of the Act
Section 7(2)(a) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) 
reads as follows:
Any income received by or accrued to any person married in or 
out of community of property (hereinafter referred to as the 
recipient) shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be 
income accrued to such person’s spouse (hereinafter referred to 
as the donor) if:
  (a) such income was derived by the recipient in consequence of 
a donation, settlement or other disposition made by the donor 
on or after 20 March 1991 or of a transaction, operation or 
scheme entered into or carried out by the donor on or after that 
date, and the sole or main purpose of such donation, settlement 
or other disposition or of such transaction, operation or scheme 
was the reduction, postponement or avoidance of the donor’s 
liability for any tax, levy or duty which, but for such donation, 
settlement, other disposition, transaction, operation or scheme, 
would have become payable by the donor under this Act or 
any other Act administered by the Commissioner; or
 (b) income was received by or accrued to the recipient:
(i) from any trade carried on by the recipient in partnership 
or association with the donor or which is in any way 
connected with any trade carried on by the donor; or
(ii) from the donor or any partnership of which the donor 
was at the time of such receipt or accrual a member or any 
private company of which the donor was at such time the 
sole or main holder of shares or one of the principal holder 
of shares, and such income represents the whole or any 
portion of the total income so received by or accrued to the 
recipient which exceeds the amount of income to which the 
recipient would reasonably be entitled having regard to the 
nature of the relevant trade, the extent of the recipient’s 
participation therein, the services rendered by the recipient 
or any other relevant factor.
Section 7(2A) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) reads 
as follows:
In the case of spouses who are married in community of property:
  (a) any income (other than income derived from the letting of 
fixed property) which has been derived from the carrying on 
of any trade shall, if such trade is carried on:
(i) by only one of the spouses, be deemed to have accrued to 
that spouse; or
(ii) jointly by both spouses, be deemed, subject to the 
provisions of subsection (2)(b), to have accrued to both 
spouses in the proportions determined by them in terms of 
the agreement that regulates their joint trade or, if there is no 
such agreement, in the proportion to which each spouse 
would reasonably be entitled having regard to the nature of 
the relevant trade, the extent of each spouse’s participation 
therein, the services rendered by each spouse or any other 
relevant factor; and
  (b) any income derived from the letting of fixed property and 
any income derived otherwise than from the carrying on of 
any trade shall be deemed to have accrued in equal shares to 
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both spouses: Provided that any such income which does not 
fall into the joint estate of the spouses shall be deemed to be 
income accrued to the spouse who is entitled thereto.
In order to determine the meaning of ‘income’ in Sections 
7(2) and 7(2A), reference is made to Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue v Simpson 4 All SA 460 (A) (the Simpson case), which 
dealt with the predecessor of the current Section 7(2). In the 
Simpson case, Judge Watermeyer noted that it was the object 
of Act 31 of 1941 (1941 Act) to tax a person’s profits or gains, 
in other words, after deducting allowable expenditure 
incurred in making those profits or gains, and not ‘income’ as 
defined in the 1941 Act (which is similar to the current 
definition of ‘income’, namely ‘gross income’ less exempt 
income). He was of the opinion that it was reasonable to 
accept that the legislature’s intention was that a husband 
(later ‘donor spouse’) should pay tax on his wife’s (later 
‘recipient spouse’) profits or gains after deducting allowable 
expenditure (in other words ‘taxable income’) and not on her 
‘income’ as defined. Based on the rule laid down in Halsbury, 
Laws of England, the court found that to use the literal 
(defined) meaning of ‘income’ would undermine the purpose 
of the section, since then the donor spouse would not be 
authorised to deduct expenditure incurred by the recipient 
spouse. Judge Watermeyer reasoned that, in practice, the 
donor spouse would surely be entitled to all the deductions 
which the recipient spouse would have been entitled to, had 
she been the taxpayer. Meyerowitz and Spiro (1995) agree 
with the view of the Simpson case, namely that ‘income’ in 
Section 7(2) refers to profits or gains, after deducting 
expenditure. De Koker and Williams (2015) also agree that 
‘income’ in the context of Section 7(2) should not be 
interpreted as ‘income’ as defined in the Act.
Interestingly, Section 7(2B) of the Act, which addresses the 
issue of the expenditure, was only inserted in the Act by 
Income Tax Act 141 of 1992, and reads as follows:
So much of any deduction or allowance which may be made 
under the provisions of this Act in the determination of the 
taxable income derived from any income referred to in 
subsections (2) and (2A) as relates to any portion of such income 
which is under the provisions of that subsection deemed to be 
income accrued to a spouse shall be deemed to be a deduction or 
allowance which may be made in the determination of the 
taxable income of such spouse. (p. 9–10)
The authors of this article are of the opinion that it must have 
been the legislature’s intention that Sections 7(2) and 7(2A) 
referred to ‘income’ as defined, or to ‘gross income’, otherwise 
Section 7(2B) would not have been added to specifically 
allow for the deduction of expenditure. Consequently, it is 
held that the interpretation of ‘income’ in the 1949 Simpson 
case, namely that Section 7(2) refers to ‘taxable income’, 
cannot be applied. Davis et al. (1999) also agree that it appears 
then that the Simpson case does not hold for Sections 7(2) 
and 7(2A). The predecessor of Section 7(2) arose in the 1914 
Act and also referred to ‘income’, but the 1914 definition of 
‘income’ was very different to the current definition. There 
was no distinction between ‘income’ and ‘gross income’ in 
1914 and ‘income’ was defined as ‘any gains or profits 
derived by, or accrued to or in favour of…’. Examples given 
in the 1914 definition included, inter alia, profit, gains, rents, 
interest and salaries, which seem to refer to gross amounts (in 
other words, before exemptions and deductions). Based on 
such an interpretation, it then makes sense that the legislature 
specifically added a provision to allow for the deduction of 
expenditure in 1992, and therefore, the authors of this article 
tend to lean towards an interpretation as ‘gross income’. 
Interestingly, these profits and gains mentioned in the 1914 
definition of ‘income’ were interpreted in the Simpson case as 
referring to net amounts, in other words, after exemptions 
and deductions. Such an interpretation, however, does not 
make sense to the authors of this article in the light of the fact 
that the legislature subsequently felt the need to add Section 
7(2B) to specifically deal with the deduction of expenditure.
Section 7(3) of the Act
Section 7(3) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) reads 
as follows:
Income shall be deemed to have been received by the parent of 
any minor child or stepchild, if by reason of any donation, 
settlement or other disposition made by that parent of that child:
  (a) it has been received by or has accrued to or in favour of that 
child or has been expended for the maintenance, education or 
benefit of that child; or
 (b) it has been accumulated for the benefit of that child.
De Swardt et al. (2015) are of the opinion that the term 
‘income’ used in Sections 7(2) to 7(7) should be interpreted as 
‘taxable income’ (based on the judgement in the Simpson 
case) and that a provision similar to Section 7(8)(b) (which 
deals with the deduction of expenditure, as discussed under 
Section 7[8]) is therefore not necessary in these sections. 
Meyerowitz (2008) also considers ‘income’ in the context of 
Section 7(3), as well as in the context of all the other deeming 
provisions of Section 7, to mean ‘taxable income’, as it is 
unbelievable that the income is deemed to be that of the 
parent and the expenditure attached to the income, is left not 
to be deductible.
The purposive interpretation approach considers, inter alia, 
the evil which the legislature is intended to forbid and punish 
(Mota 2012). According to Olivier (1989), the purpose of 
Sections 7(3) to 7(6) is not to punish a taxpayer but to prevent 
tax avoidance. Any interpretation which will place the 
taxpayer in a worst position than what he would have been 
normally, therefore, seems to be contrary to the legislature’s 
intention. So for instance, in this case, it would not make 
sense to be taxed on deemed income but not to be able to 
benefit from possible exemptions or deductions. Therefore, 
where no specific deductions provision exist in a section, it 
seems reasonable that the ‘income’ referred to in the section, 
should be interpreted as ‘taxable income’. Alternatively, one 
can argue that no deductions are allowed, as no specific 
provision is made for it and therefore that ‘income’ cannot 
imply ‘taxable income’.
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De Koker and Williams (2015) are of the opinion that, 
although no authority exists for it, for purposes of this 
section and Sections 7(4) to 7(7), ‘income’ should be 
interpreted as ‘gross income’ less related deductible 
expenses and losses. According to them, it would be unfair 
if the term ‘income’ is interpreted as defined, as a deduction 
for expenses incurred, will not be allowed. The authors of 
this article, therefore, agree that an interpretation that is 
more favourable to the taxpayer, namely ‘taxable income’, 
should be considered in the light of the contra fiscum rule. 
However, in the light of the fact that both Sections 7(2B) 
and 7(8)(b) specifically allow the deduction of expenses, it 
seems reasonable to the authors of this article to assume 
that such deductions are not allowed in the other 
subsections of Section 7. Therefore, it is submitted that the 
interpretation of ‘income’ as ‘taxable income’ in this 
context was not the legislature’s intended meaning. If the 
term ‘income’ in the context of Section 7(3) is indeed 
interpreted in line with the view of De Koker and Williams 
(2015), namely as ‘gross income’ less related deductible 
expenses and losses, the question arises as to whether 
exempt income is simply ignored? In Section 7(7), the 
benefit of exempt income is specifically withheld from the 
taxpayer that is taxed on the deemed income; therefore, it 
is submitted by the authors of this article that one must 
assume that in the other subsections the taxpayer is 
entitled to that benefit. Otherwise, the legislature would 
have made specific mention of exempt income in all the 
other subsections and not merely in Section 7(7). If, 
however, no exempt income is applicable in a scenario and 
‘deductible’ has the same meaning as ‘allowable’ 
deductions in terms of the Act, then the meaning of 
‘income’ according to these authors, is similar to 
Meyerowitz and De Swardt et al.’s ‘taxable income’. 
However, Davis et al. (1999) argued that, as the legislature 
provided specifically for net income (after deductions) to 
be attributed only under subsection (8), ‘gross income’ has 
to be attributed under the other subsections, which include 
Section 7(3).
According to Meyerowitz (2008), interpreting ‘income’ 
as ‘taxable income’ in Section 7 is also the view accepted 
by the South African Revenue Service (SARS). However, 
if that is the case, why is it not indicated as such in the Act 
or through guidance issued by the SARS and were 
provisions allowing the deduction of expenditure only 
added to Sections 7(2) and 7(8)? Therefore, the authors of 
this article do not agree with such an interpretation and 
are of the opinion that the meaning of ‘income’ in this 
subsection is intended to be ‘income’ as defined in Section 
1 of the Act.
It is clearly evident that, based on the above-mentioned 
proposed interpretations, uncertainty exists with regard to 
the meaning of the term ‘income’ in this context, and different 
authors have different views. Similarly, uncertainty exists 
with regard to the meaning of the term ‘income’ throughout 
Sections 7(4) to 7(8), as illustrated below.
Section 7(4) of the Act
Section 7(4) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) reads 
as follows:
Any income received by or accrued to or in favour of any minor 
child or stepchild of any person, by reason of any donation, 
settlement or other disposition made by any other person, shall 
be deemed to be the income of the parent of that child, if such 
parent or his or her spouse has made a donation, settlement or 
other disposition or given some other consideration in favour 
directly or indirectly of the said other person or his or her family. 
(Republic of South Africa, 1962:42)
The various authors ascribe a similar meaning to the term 
‘income’ in Section 7(4) to that of Section 7(3) discussed 
above. These interpretations include ‘taxable income’, ‘gross 
income’ less related expenses and losses and ‘gross income’, 
while the authors of this article believe that it should be 
interpreted as ‘income’ as defined in Section 1 of the Act, as 
nothing indicates the contrary with reference to the 
interpretations discussed under Section 7(3).
Section 7(5) of the Act
Section 7(5) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) reads 
as follows:
If any person has made any donation, settlement or other 
disposition which is subject to a stipulation or condition, whether 
made or imposed by such person or anybody else, to the effect 
that the beneficiaries thereof or some of them shall not receive 
the income or some portion of the income thereunder until the 
happening of some event, whether fixed or contingent, so much 
of any income as would, but for such stipulation or condition, in 
consequence of the donation, settlement or other disposition be 
received by or accrue to or in favour of the beneficiaries, shall, 
until the happening of that event or the death of that person, 
whichever first takes place, be deemed to be the income of that 
person. (Republic of South Africa, 1962:42–43)
The various authors’ possible interpretations of the term 
‘income’ discussed in Section 7(3), which also apply in the 
context of Section 7(5), include ‘taxable income’, ‘gross 
income’ less related expenses and losses and ‘gross income’. 
They all seem to agree that ‘income’ in Section 7(5) is not 
meant to be interpreted as ‘income’ as defined. According to 
Clegg and Stretch (2015), problems can arise where, for 
example, a South African resident trust has been funded by a 
non-resident and the nature of the funding was gratuitous, 
when ‘income’ is interpreted as ‘income’ as defined. For 
instance, it is questionable, according to the author, whether 
the deemed ‘income’ amounts of the non-resident funder can 
nevertheless be exempt from tax, if they comply with the 
provisions of Section 10 that are applicable to non-residents. 
These authors further state that, for an interpretation of 
‘income’ as ‘taxable income’ to hold (in other words, allowing 
non-resident exemptions), Section 7(5) should be interpreted 
as deeming the income to accrue to the non-resident. 
However, if ‘income’ is rather seen as having its defined 
meaning, then the assumption needs to be that the 
income, which essentially accrues to a resident, would be 
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‘income’ (in other words, after Section 10 exemptions 
applicable to residents) of the resident and henceforth must 
be deemed ‘income’ of the non-resident. Clegg and Stretch 
(2015) submit all in all, although the matter cannot be beyond 
doubt, that the latter interpretation, namely ‘income’ as 
defined in the Act, is better, as that is also what they 
understand the view of the SARS to be. For the same reasons 
mentioned in the context of Section 7(3), the authors of this 
article also believe that the term ‘income’ in Section 7(4) 
should be interpreted as ‘income’ as defined in the Act.
Section 7(6) of the Act
Section 7(6) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) reads 
as follows:
If any deed of donation, settlement or other disposition contains 
any stipulation that the right to receive any income thereby 
conferred may, under powers retained by the person by whom 
that right is conferred, be revoked or conferred upon another, so 
much of any income as in consequence of the donation, settlement 
or other disposition is received by or accrues to or in favour of the 
person on whom that right is conferred, shall be deemed to be the 
income of the person by whom it is conferred, so long as he retains 
those powers. (Republic of South Africa, 1962:43)
Interpretations of the term ‘income’ in Section 7(6) are similar 
to those discussed for Section 7(3). These interpretations 
include ‘gross income’ less related deductible expenses and 
losses, and ‘taxable income’, while Davis et al. (1999), 
however, interpret it as ‘gross income’. The authors of this 
article agree that a gross amount, before deductions and 
exemptions, is implied in this context, based on the phrase 
‘the right to receive any income’. This leads the authors of 
this article to believe that a taxpayer is in fact entitled to 
income exemptions in the other subsections of Section 7 in 
which the wording does not specifically refer to gross 
amounts, such as here.
Section 7(7) of the Act
Section 7(7) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) reads 
as follows:
If by reason of any donation, settlement or other disposition 
made, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, by 
any person (hereinafter referred to as the donor):
  (a) the donor’s right to receive or have paid to him or for his 
benefit any amount by way of rent, dividend, foreign dividend, 
interest, royalty or similar income in respect of any movable or 
immovable property (including without limiting the foregoing 
any lease, company share, marketable security, deposit, loan, 
copyright, design or trade mark) or in respect of the use of, or 
the granting of permission to use, such property, is ceded or 
otherwise made over to any other person or to a third party for 
that other person’s benefit in such manner that the donor 
remains the owner of or retains an interest in the said property 
or if the said property or interest is transferred, delivered or 
made over to the said other person or to a third party for the 
said other person’s benefit, in such manner that the donor is or 
will at a fixed or determinable time be entitled to regain 
ownership of or the interest in the said property; or
  (b) the donor’s right to receive or have paid to him or for his 
benefit any income that is or may become due to him by any 
other person acting in a fiduciary capacity is ceded or 
otherwise made over to any other person or to a third party for 
that other person’s benefit in such manner that the donor is or 
will at a determinable time be entitled to regain the said right,
any such rent, dividend, foreign dividend, interest, royalty or 
income (including any amount which, but for this subsection, 
would have been exempt from tax in the hands of the said other 
person) as is received by or accrues to or for the benefit of the 
said other person on or after 1 July 1983 and which would 
otherwise, but for the said donation, settlement or other 
disposition, have been received by or have accrued to or for the 
benefit of the donor, shall be deemed to have been received by or 
to have accrued to the donor.
The various interpretations of the term ‘income’ that were 
already discussed for Section 7(3) apply similarly to Section 
7(7) and include those of De Koker and Williams (2015), 
namely ‘gross income’ less related deductible expenses and 
losses, in contrast with Meyerowitz’s (2008) and De Swardt 
et al.’s (2015) opinion that ‘income’ should rather be interpreted 
as ‘taxable income’. The authors of this article, however, 
agree with Davis et al. (1999) that the meaning of ‘income’ in 
this context can be interpreted as ‘gross income’. This is 
deduced from the wording in the last sentence of Section 7(7), 
which includes otherwise exempt income in the ‘income’ that 
the taxpayer is deemed to have received. Once again this 
leads the authors of this article to believe that a taxpayer is 
entitled to income exemptions in the subsections of Section 7 
where the wording does not specifically disregard exemptions 
as in Section 7(7).
Section 7(8) of the Act
Section 7(8) of the Act (Republic of South Africa 1962) reads 
as follows:
(a) Where by reason of or in consequence of any donation, 
settlement or other disposition (other than a donation, settlement 
or other disposition to an entity which is not a resident and 
which is similar to a public benefit organisation contemplated in 
section 30) made by any resident, any amount is received by or 
accrued to any person who is not a resident (other than a 
controlled foreign company in relation to such resident), which 
would have constituted income had that person been a resident, 
there shall be included in the income of that resident so much of 
that amount as is attributable to that donation, settlement or 
other disposition.
(b) So much of any expenditure, allowance or loss incurred by 
the person contemplated in paragraph:
  (a) as does not exceed the amount included in the income of 
the resident in terms of that paragraph and which would be 
allowable as a deduction under this Act in the determination of 
the taxable income derived from that amount had that person 
been a resident, is deemed to be an expenditure, allowance or 
loss incurred by that resident for purposes of the determination 
of the taxable income of that resident from that amount.
What makes this subsection different from subsections 7(3) to 
7(7) is the existence of Section 7(8)(b), included in 2005, which 
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specifically allows the deduction of certain expenditure, 
allowances or losses relating to the deemed income (Republic 
of South Africa 2005a). This is similar to Section 7(2B).
Clegg and Stretch (2015) state that ‘income’ in the context of 
Section 7(8) should be interpreted as ‘income’ as defined in the 
Act. However, when interpreting the meaning in the context of 
Section 7(8), one should consider the amendment of Section 
7(8) to refer to ‘any amount’ instead of to ‘income’ (Republic of 
South Africa 2004a). The reason for the amendment was that it 
might have been argued that the term ‘income’ in the previous 
version of Section 7(8), only referred to income from a South 
African source and that foreign-sourced income of a non-
resident technically fell outside the ambit of Section 7(8) 
(Republic of South Africa 2004b). The amendment therefore 
ensures that all the receipts and accruals of a non-resident are 
deemed to be income of the resident, if they would have 
constituted income had they been received by or accrued to a 
resident (Republic of South Africa 2005b). Once Section 7(8)(b) 
was subsequently added, the resident is now allowed to 
deduct allowable expenses too. According to Clegg and Stretch 
(2015), until this amendment, it was considered that ‘income’ 
in this context should have been interpreted as a net amount, 
calculated in a similar manner as ‘taxable income’, based on 
only income from a South African source. Meyerowitz’s (2008) 
interpretation of ‘income’ as ‘taxable income’ agrees to some 
extent to that of Clegg and Stretch, although he does not 
address the effect of the amendment on his interpretation. De 
Swardt et al. (2015) and De Koker and Williams (2015) are of 
the opinion that ‘income’ in this context should be interpreted 
as ‘income’ as defined. The authors of this article believe that 
the legislature intended for ‘income’ in the context of Section 
7(8) to be interpreted either as ‘gross income’ or ‘income’ as 
defined, otherwise they would not have specifically provided 
for the deductibility of expenditure. In Section 7(7) the benefit 
of exempt income is specifically withheld from the taxpayer 
that is taxed on the deemed income, and in Section 7(6) the 
wording specifically refers to gross amounts being taxable as 
deemed income. Therefore, it is submitted by the authors of 
this article that one must assume that in the other subsections 
where the wording is silent regarding exemptions, the taxpayer 
is entitled to potential income exemptions. Consequently, the 
authors of this article agree with De Swardt et al. (2015) and De 
Koker and Williams (2015) that ‘income’ in the context of 
Section 7(8) should be interpreted as ‘income’ as defined.
Basic illustration of effect of different 
interpretations on a taxpayer’s taxable income
An example of the impact of each possible interpretation, as 
discussed in the section ‘Understanding the meaning of 
“income” in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of the Act’ of this article, is 
now provided to illustrate the effect of possible incorrect 
interpretations of the term ‘income’ in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of 
the Act.
Assume that taxpayer X is deemed, by any one of Sections 
7(2) to 7(8), to be taxable on certain ‘income’ received by or 
accrued to person A. A breakdown of amounts received by or 
accrued to person A by reason of a donation, settlement or 
other disposition by taxpayer X, together with related 
expenditure incurred by person A, is as in Table 1 (in rand).
Table 2 illustrates the amounts that would be included in 
taxpayer X’s income in his income tax return, based on each 
of the possible interpretations of ‘income’ in Section 7.
This example clearly illustrates the significant impact that the 
interpretation of the term ‘income’ in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) can 
have on a taxpayer’s ‘taxable income’ and for which a suitable 
solution is required to ensure consistency.
Conclusion and recommendations
In terms of the literal approach of interpretation, unless the 
context otherwise indicates, the term ‘income’ in Sections 
7(2) to 7(8) of the Act should be ascribed its ordinary meaning, 
as defined in Section 1 of the Act. Based on the study 
performed, however, the context of Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of the 
Act sometimes indicates a different meaning. The purposive 
approach was therefore followed to determine the meaning 
of the term ‘income’ that is used in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) of the 
Act. Interestingly, it was established that different authors 
interpret the meaning of the term ‘income’ differently, and 
the interpretations also differ among the various subsections 
of Section 7. The authors of this article believe that the 
legislature’s intention, albeit possibly unfair in terms of not 
allowing deductions or exemptions throughout Section 7, 
was for the term ‘income’ to be interpreted as ‘gross income’ 
in Sections 7(2), 7(6) and 7(7) and as ‘income’ in Sections 7(3), 
7(4), 7(5) and 7(8).
The meaning of the term ‘income’ for purposes of Sections 7(2) 
to 7(8) of the Act can be widely argued and remains an 
uncertainty. It is therefore imperative that application guidance 
is issued or that the wording in Sections 7(2) to 7(8) be amended 
to reflect the intended meaning of the legislature, where it is 
not meant to be ‘income’ as defined in Section 1 of the Act.
TABLE 2: Possible amounts to be included in taxpayer’s tax return.
Description Rand
‘Gross income’ or amount 100 000
Section 1 definition (‘gross income’ less exempt income) 90 000
‘Taxable income’ (‘income’ less allowable expenditure)  
or profits or gains†
75 000
‘Gross income’ less related deductible expenditure 85 000
†, Based on the Simpson case, these are interpreted as being the same.
TABLE 1: Receipts or accruals and related expenditure.
Description Rand
Gross earnings or receipts or proceeds (assume that this full 
amount also meets the definition of ‘gross income’ in the Act)
100 000
• Portion that is exempt from tax 10 000
• Portion that is taxable 90 000
Related expenditure incurred 20 000
•  Portion that would have been deductible for tax purposes by 
person A, should he have been taxed on the income
15 000
• Non-deductible portion 5 000
Net profit before tax 80 000
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